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COMMENTS
LAw -· FEDERAL INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST
The increasing tendency of state
legislatures to establish administrative agencies to regulate various specialized fields has created serious new problems for both courts and
lawyers. In dealing with state administrative agencies, the federal
courts have been confronted with the dual problem of protecting the
individual's constitutional rights and at the same time respecting the
prerogatives of the states. The result has been the development of a
"hands-off" policy in the federal courts, leaving the initial determinaADMINisTBATIVE
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tion of rights to the state courts, and limiting the use of the federal
injunctive power. The purpose of this comment is to indicate the
limitations now placed on resort to federal injunctive relief against
state administrative orders.

I
Faced with a need to obtain relief for his client against a confiscatory state administrative rate order, a lawyer will attempt to choose
the forum which will give him the most adequate and sympathetic
hearing. Until 1908 he could seek an injunction against the order
from a federal district court, if he could show the required diversity
of citizenship of the parties, or if he could raise a federal question.1
In that year, however, the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Prentis 11. Atlantic Coast Line Co.2 imposed a major limitation on this
resort. Thereafter, it was announced, the petitioner would be required
to exhaust all the administrative appeals provided by the state, including "administrative appeal" in state courts, before he could ask a federal court for an injunction. For this purpose administrative appeals in
the courts are distinguished from judicial appeals on several grounds.
First of all, if the court can "affirm, modify, or revoke" the order appealed from, it is in effect passing upon a basic policy question and
making a new order, so the process is deemed to be administrative.3
On the other hand, if the court is limited to passing on the validity
of the existing order, the appeal is judicial.4 The Supreme Court also
announced that the administrative appeal does not result in a decision
to which the rules of res judicata apply.5 Subsequently the Supreme
Court stated it would not hear a review of an administrative appeal. 6
A judicial appeal, however, does result in res judicata, so the only remaining remedy is review by the Supreme Court.7
State authorities at the time of the Prentis case were already manifesting dissatisfaction with the system that allowed a single federal
judge to enjoin state action.8 Congress consequently enacted legisla11 Stat. L. 78 (1789), 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §1332.
2211 U.S. 210, 29 S.Ct. 67 (1908).
3Ibid.
4 Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Kuykendall, 265 U.S. 196, 44 S.Ct. 553
(1924); Bacon v. Rutland R. Co., 232 U.S. 134, 34 S.Ct. 283 (1914).
5 Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 29 S.Ct. 67 (1908).
6 Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co., 281 U.S. 464, 50 S.Ct. 389
(1930).
.
7 Stason, "Methods of Judicial Relief from Administrative Action," 24 A.B.A.J. 274
(1938); Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 29 S.Ct. 67 (1908).
s For an account of the history of the Johnson Act, 48 Stat. L. 775 (1934), as
amended, 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §1342, see Stason, ''Methods of Judicial Relief from
Administrative Action," 24 A.B.A.J. 274 (1938).
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tion which limits the use of the injunction by requiring a three-judge
district court for the setting aside of state administrative orders,9 and
which provides for direct appeal to the Supreme Court.10 A later congressional enactment requires the federal district courts to stay action
if the state has granted a stay of the order pending determination of
the state action to enforce the order.11 Still later appeared the Johnson Act,1 2 pursuant to which, if jurisdiction is based on diversity of
citizenship or a federal question of constitutionality, a state rate order
cannot be enjoined if the order does not interfere with interstate commerce and if there is a plain, adequate, and. speedy remedy provided by
state law. Moreover, an assessment, levy, or collection of a tax under
state law may not be enjoined if there is a plain, adequate, and speedy
state remedy.13 All of these limitations serve to impose substantial
qualifications upon the federal equity injunction against state administrative orders.

II
In cases not specifically dealing with administrative law, the courts
have placed other limitations on the general power of the federal district courts to grant injunctions before the state courts have been
given a chance for judicial review. State criminal proceedings will
not be enjoined unless there is danger of irreparable injury.14 The
state's fiscal affairs will not be interfered ·with.15 If the interests of the
parties are properly protected by state laws, and an adequate procedure
is provided, liquidation of state banks on insolvency is left to state
courts.16 Even in bankruptcy proceedings, matters requiring ultimate
.determination by state courts will be left to the state court for decision,
and the federal bankruptcy proceeding will be stayed for such determination.17 When an action is brought to shape a domestic policy
9 36 Stat. L. 557 (1910), 43 Stat. L. 938 (1925), as amended, 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V,
1952) §2281.
10 36 Stat. L. 557 (1910), 43 Stat. L. 938 (1925), as amended, 28 U.S.C. (Supp.
V, 1952) §1253.
1137 Stat. L. 1014 (1913), as amended, 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §2284(5).
12 48 Stat. L. 775 (1934), as amended, 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §1342.
1s 50 Stat. L. 738 (1937), as amended, 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1952) §1341.
14 Spielman Motor Sales Co., Inc. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89, 55 S.Ct. 678 (1935);
Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 61 S.Ct. 962 (1941); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319
U.S. 157, 63 S.Ct. 877 (1943).
lUMatthews v. Rodgets, 284 U.S. 521, 52 S.Ct. 217 (1932); Ristey v. Chicago, R.I.
& P. Ry. Co., 270 U.S. 378, 46 S.Ct. 236 (1926) (equity can act if the entire tax statute
is attacked as unconstitutional).
16Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176, 55 S.Ct. 380 (1935).
17Thompson, Trustee v. Magnolia Petroleum. Co., 309 U.S. 478, 60 S.Ct. 628 (1940).
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within the state, federal equity will not interfere.18 And, of course,
in every case a cause of action has to be stated which will give equity
jurisdiction to a federal court.19 If a question of state law is to be decided, the federal district court can stay proceedings until the state
court decides the state law question.20 There is some suggestion, too,
that the older view that "adequate remedy in law" referred only to
federal remedy21 has been changing to the view that it also includes
state remedies.22
While there has been an occasional judicial expression to the effect
that the district court can decide state law questions itself if the matter is essentially federal,23 the tendency has been such that the attorney general's committee in its first report suggested that there has been
less and less federal review of many questions where appeal formerly
was considered important.24

m
25

Soon after the Prentis case was decided, the courts began to
limit its application. If the administrative agency delayed for an unreasonable time in reaching a decision, the petitioner could go into the
district court without waiting for a :final 'administrative order.26 If the
agency lacked power to act, there was no need to resort to it.27 When
irreparable damage was being done, and no stay was provided pending
1s Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 63 S.Ct. 1070 (1943);
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 63 S.Ct. 1098 (1943); In re President and Fellows
of Harvard College, (1st Cir. 1945) 149 F. (2d) 69.
19 Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W. I. Southern, Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 59 S.Ct. 657 (1939).
20RaiJroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643 (1941);
Siler v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 29 S.Ct. 451 (1909). To the list
of exceptions should be added the power to refuse jurisdiction in admiralty, represented by
Canada Malting Co. v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd., 285 U.S. 413, 52 S.Ct. 413 (1932).
The e.-:ercise of such discretion will be set aside only when there is clearly an abuse.
21 Smyth v• .Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 18 S.Ct. 418 (1898); Spector Motor Service, Inc.
v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 71 S.Ct. 508 (1951).
.
22 Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 63 S.Ct. 1070
(1943); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 67 S.Ct. 839 (1947) (suggesting the
court may apply the forum non conveniens rule when the state can give adequate relief).
23Siler v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 29 S.Ct. 451 (1909);
Meyers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 at 51, 58 S.Ct. 459 (1937); In
re President and Fellows of Harvard College, (1st Cir. 1945) 149 F. (2d) 69 (when
jurisdiction attaches, court will decide state law questions except in exceptional circumstances); Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Board of Public Utility Commissionexs,
(D.C. N.J. 1952) 107 F. Supp. 521; Public Utilities Commission of Ohio v. United Fuel
Gas Co., 317 U.S. 456, 63 S.Ct. 369 (1943).
24S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st sess. (1941).
2s Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 29 S.Ct. 67 (1908).
26 Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 270 U.S. 587, 46 S.Ct. 408 (1926).
27Buder v. First National Bank in St. Louis, (8th Cir. 1927) 16 F. (2d) 990, cert.
den. 274 U.S. 743, 47 S.Ct. 588 (1927).
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appeal, petitioner could seek a federal injunction at once.28 If the
petitioner claimed the statute was unconstitutional, the federal court
was immediately available.29 A statutory opportunity for rehearing
before the agency had to be resorted to only if the state made an application for such rehearing mandatory.30
However, the basic "exhaustion rule" of the Prentis case31 remains.
The reasons given for this rule are that it effects a better working
relation between the federal and state governments and that the court
is unwilling to reach a decision only to find the work rendered useless
when th~ higher state body holds the order improper. Prior to the
Prentis decision, the courts had already decided that application to
the agency itself was a condition of federal relief-the so-called "prior
resort" rule. Perhaps some of the reasons which had caused the courts
to develop that rule also played a part in the evolution of the rule
in the Prentis case. Indeed, there might be a complete denial of relief
on the ground that there was a failure to pursue the administrative
remedy.32 The reasons generally given for the "prior resort" rule are
the need of uniformity in application of the agency rules, something
that cannot be achieved if the federal equity courts may pass in the
first instances on the cases,33 and the fact that the agency generally
possesses more adequate lmowledge than the court on the specialized
subject the agency is created to hanclle.34 Thus, the person who fears
that a general administrative rule or policy will be confiscatory when
applied to him is required to apply first to the agency for a determination of applicability in his case.35
2s Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, 261 U.S. 290, 43 S.Ct. 353 (1923); Pacific
Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Kuykendall, 265 U.S. 196, 44 S.Ct. 553 (1924).
20 Buder v. Fust National Bank in St. Louis, (8th Cir. 1927) 16 F. (2d) 990, cert.
den. 274 U.S. 743, 47 S.Ct. 588 (1927); Railroad and Warehouse Commission of Ivlinnesota v. Duluth R. Co., 273 U.S. 625, 47 S.Ct. 489 (1927).
30Prendergast v. New York Telephone Co., 262 U.S. 43, 43 S.Ct. 466 (1923);
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Public Service Commission of South Carolina, (D.C. S.C.
1948) 77 F. Supp. 675. But see Red River Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, (D.C. Cir. 1938) 98
F. (2d) 282, suggesting that a merely permissive rehearing must be exhausted.
31 Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 29 S.Ct. 67 (1908).
32 First National Bank 0£ Greeley v. Board of County Commissioners of the County
of Weld, 264 U.S. 450, 44 S.Ct. 385 (1924). The decision limited itself to tax assessment
cases on the grounds of public need for prompt determination. The rule appears to be one
of estoppel. See Stason,. ''Timing of Judicial Redress from Erroneous Administrative Ar::tion," 25 MINN. L. R:sv. 560 (1941).
33Texas ancl Pacific Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 27 S.Ct. 350
(1907).
34RaiJroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573, 60
S.Ct. 1021 (1940), 311 U.S. 614, 61 S.Ct. 66 (1940), 311 U.S. 570, 61 S.Ct. 343 (1941).
35Texas and Pacific Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 27 S.Ct. 350
(1907); Great Northem Ry. Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 42 S.Ct. 477
(1922); United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard Steamship Co., 284 U.S. 474, 52 S.Ct.
247 (1932).
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IV
While federal injunctive relief was somewhat disfavored, nevertheless it appears to have been the rule until 1951 that there did not
need to be exhaustion of state judicial remedies before the petitioner
sought an injunction in federal courts.36 In such instances federal
jurisdiction was concurrent with that of state courts,37 and the petitioner had the privilege of choosing his forum. If chosen, the federal
court had the duty to take jurisdiction.38 Apprehension was sometimes
expressed that if state judicial remedies were utilized, the petitioner
would reach the Supreme Court with the facts decided against him,39
notwithstanding the fact that the Ben Avon decision40 indicated the
Supreme Court had to be afforded the power to review the facts when
an order was alleged to be confiscatory.
Then in 1951 came the decision in Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern Pacific Ry. Co.41 In that case the Supreme Court
held that a federal district court should, in the exercise of its discretion,
refuse jurisdiction in an injunction proceeding against a public service
commission when the state judicial remedies have not been exhausted.
The Alabama suit was brought to enjoin an order requiring the railroad
to maintain two local trains a day between certain points. The plaintiff
contended that the operation was so costly as to amount to confiscation.
Two justices concurred in the Supreme Court's decision on the ground
that the company had not shown it was losing money on the entire
operation in the state and hence that there was confiscation. Nevertheless, they objected to the majority opinion, contending that in
36Lilienthal, "The Federal Courts and State Regulation of Public Utilities," 43 HAnv.
L. R:sv. 379 (1929), suggests that the right to by-pass the state courts for a federal injunction was recognized "beyond question." See Bacon v. Rutland R. Co., 232 U.S. 134, 34
S.Ct. 283 (1914); Railroad and Warehouse Commission of Minnesota v. Duluth Street
Ry. Co., 273 U.S. 625, 47 S.Ct. 489 (1927); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 59 S.Ct. 872
(1939); Columbia Ry., Gas & Electric Co. v. Elease, (D.C. S.C. 1927) 42 F. (2d) 463;
Ann Arbor R. Co. v. Michigan Public Service Commission, (D.C. Mich. 1950) 91 F.
Supp. 668; Southern Ry. Co. v. Alabama Public Service Commission, (D.C. Ala. 1950)
91 F. Supp. 980.
37 Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. (19 U.S.) 264 (1821).
38 Ibid.; Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19 at 40, 29 S.Ct. 192 (1909)
("That the case may be one of local interest only jg entirely immaterial ••••"); Prentis v.
Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 at 228, 29 S.Ct. 67 (1908) ("A State cannot tie
up a citizen of another State, having property within its territory invaded by unauthorized
acts of its own officers, to suits for redress in its own courts").
39 Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 29 S.Ct. 67 (1908).
40 Ohio Valley Water Co. v. ]Jen Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 40 S.Ct. 527 (1920).
Other decisions also held constitutional facts were a sufficient basis for jurisdiction. St.
Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 56 S.Ct. 720 (1936); Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441 (1908).
41341 U.S. 341, 71 S.Ct. 762 (1951).
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requiring resort to the state courts in such cases the decision served
to overturn "a long course of decisions and, in effect, to repeal an act
of Congress defining the jurisdiction of the district courts."42
The Alabama Public Service Commission decision appears to put
new life into the Prentis doctrine.43 Evidently if there is any state court
remedy, whether it is administrative or judicial, the petitioner must exhaust it before he can proceed in the federal courts. About the same
reasons are given for the need to exhaust judicial remedies as were
given in the Prentis ·case. Another possible reason for the decision
is the desire to relieve the federal docket.44 The Prentis case had
indicated that exhaustion of state administrative appeals before coming
into federal courts for an injunction would not place the petitioner in
a position in which he was barred from litigating the facts by res
judicata. The Prentis case continued, however, that exhaustion of
state judicial remedies would result in res judicata, so that these state
judicial remedies need not be exhausted before petitioner could seek
federal injunctive relief. The Alabama case4 i; appears to do away
·with this res judicata distinction between state administrative and
judicial appeals. This elimination of the res judicata distinction appears
to be in line with the gradual extinction of the Ben Avon ruling46 that
in a case of alleged confiscation, the court must look at both law and
facts.47 Redetermination of the facts by the courts no longer seems
important.

V
While it is too early to be sure what effect the Alabama decision
will have on administrative law, some generalizations can be made at
this time. Lower courts in general are consistently applying the de42 Id. at 355. One other possible change in the law should be noted. The old view,
represented by Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 18 S.Ct. 418 (1898), had been that in
determining the reasonableness of an administrative rate order, the actual transaction would
govern, and the net gain from total operation, or even state operation, would have no bearlng
on the case. The concurring opinion suggests that a larger view may now be taken.
43 P.rentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 29 S.Ct. 67 (1908:).
44 46 Ir.r.. L. fuv. 756 (1951).
4G Alabama Public Service Commission v. Southern Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 71 S.Ct.
762 (1951).
46 Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 40 S.Ct. 527 (1920).
47 Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 at 321, 56 S.Ct. 466
(1936): "We think ••• that the opportunity to resort to equity, in the absence of an
adequate legal remedy • • • should not be curtailed because of reluctance to decide consti·
tutional questions." But the Court later began to allow the agency to determine the "jurisdictional facts," Meyers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 58 S.Ct. 459
(1938), and then it was held that rates had to be clearly confiscatory before equity would
intervene, Vincennes Water Supply Co. v. Public Service Commission of Indiana, (7th
Cir. 1929) 34 F. (2d) 5, cert. den. 280 U.S. 567, 50 S.Ct. 26 (1929).
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cision to require judicial review in state courts prior to any federal
action.48 One court suggests that "adequate remedy at law" now
clearly refers to state remedy as well as federal remedy.49
But limitations are being placed on the doctrine as well. One
court has said that the rule applies only to regulatory orders, as distinguished from allegedly unconstitutional tax levies by state agencies.1so
The federal district court of Minnesota suggests that predominantly
local factors must be found in the case before the federal equity court
will refuse jurisdiction.51 The New Jersey federal district court has
made a similar statement, holding that it would retain jurisdiction
when federal law must be weighed against state rules even when the
state rules have not been construed.52 The California federal court
asserts that the Alabama doctrine applies only to constitutional improprieties in enforcing state laws, not to cases in which state law
conflicts with a federal statute.53 The doctrine has been held not to
apply to fundamental rights which petitioner declared were denied
by a state administrative body.54 In Peay 11. Cox the court, after citing
the Alabama case, continues: "The only trouble here [in the use of
discretion] comes from the distinction set up in some of the cases
between State remedies which are administrative ._ .. [as in this case]
and those which are judicial and operate only to shift the case from
a federal court into a state court and end in a res judicata • . • . Such
a remedy need not be exhausted."55 This dicta has the appearance of
desire to nullify the Alabama decision. It would seem,· therefore,
that the last word on the question of exhaustion of judicial remedies
in state courts has not as yet been said.
48 Rock Island Motor Transit Co. v. Mmphy Motor Freight Lines, Inc., (D.C. Mum.
1952) 101 F. Supp. 978; Pierce v. Hildebrand, (D.C. Iowa 1952) 103 F. Supp. 396;
Atlantic Freight Lines, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, (D.C. Pa. 1952)
109 F. Supp. 385. Cf. Red Rock Cola Co. v. Red Rock Bottlers, Inc., (5th Cir. 1952)
195 F. (2d) 406.
49 Local 333B, United Marine Division of International Longshoremen's Assn. v.
Battle, Governor of Virginia, (D.C. Va. 1951) 101 F. Supp. 650, alfd. per curlam 342 U.S.
880, 72 S.Ct. 178 (1951).
5 0 Centrnl Steel & Wire Co. v. Detroit, (D.C. Mich. 1951) 101 F. Supp. 470. This
case was not in equity. The complaint was brought to recover taxes paid under protest,
and unconstitutionality was claimed.
6 1 Rock Island Motor Transit Co. v. Mmphy Motor Freight Lines, Inc., (D.C. Mum.
1952) 101 F. Supp. 978 ai: 981.
6 2Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners,
(D.C. N.J. 1952) 107 F. Supp. 521.
63 United Air Lines, Inc. v. Public Utilities Commission of California, (D.C. Cal.
1952) 109 F. Supp. 13. Cf. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Board of Public
Utility Commissionexs, (D.C. N.J. 1952) 107 F. Supp. 521.
6 t Wilson v. Beebe, (D.C. Del. 1951) 99 F. Supp. 418.
6 5 (5th Cir. 1951) 190 F. (2d) 123 at 125, cert. den. 342 U.S. 896, 72 S.Ct. 230
(1951).
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VI
The Alabama decision66 does provide a new and clear-cut rule:
it is necessary to make use of all the state remedies provided, whether
at the administrative level ·or at the court level, whether "administrative" in nature or judicial. The rule simplifies procedure and minimizes the possibility of error. A wrong step, under the old rule, could
cost the petitioner his case, or, at best, a great deal of time and expense.67 The Supreme Court has held, of course, that if no state
judicial review is provided, the statute creating the agency is unconstitutional.58 Now it appears that this state review must be followed,
with review by the Supreme Court as a final protection, and 'With. stay
of enforcement during the appeals as a means of preventing irreparable
damage. The rule, however, is one of "comity and convenience."59
A major question of policy remains to be answered: should the Supreme Court legislate, where Congress has not done so, to deprive
petitioners of the concurrent federal court action-a very speedy and
efficient means of preventing enforcement of improper state administrative orders?
John C. Hall, S.Ed.

50 Aia'bama Pu'blic Service Commission v. Southem Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 71 S.Ct.
762 (1951).
67 46 Ir.x.. L. R:ev. 756 (1951). Nine years were required for a nnal decision in
Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602, 71 S.Ct. 508 (1951).
68 Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 40 S.Ct. 527 (1920).
6 9 Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643 (1941);
Alabama Pu'blic Service Commission v. Southern Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 71 S.Ct. 762
(1951).

